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 Businesses have long tried to influence political outcomes, but 
today, there is a new and potent form of corporate political 
power—Platform Advocacy.  Internet-based platforms, such as Fa-
cebook, Google, and Uber, mobilize their user bases through di-
rect solicitation of support and the more troubling exploitation of 
irrational behavior.  Platform Advocacy helps platforms push pol-
icy agendas that create favorable legal environments for them-
selves, thereby strengthening their own dominance in the market-
place.  This new form of advocacy will have radical effects on 
deliberative democracy. 
 In the age of constant digital noise and uncertainty, it is more 
important than ever to detect and analyze new forms of political 
power.  This Article will contribute to our understanding of one 
such new form and provide a way forward to ensure the excep-
tional power of platforms do not improperly influence consumers 
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Democracy cannot succeed unless those who express their choice are 
prepared to choose wisely.—Franklin D. Roosevelt1 
 
I care deeply about the democratic process and protecting its integ-
rity . . . .  I don’t want anyone to use our tools to undermine democracy.  
That’s not what we stand for.—Mark Zuckerberg2 
INTRODUCTION 
If you opened your Uber app in New York City in June of 2015, you 
would have noticed an interesting choice among car options: “de Blasio.”3  If 
you slid to it, a message would appear: “See What Happens.”4  With a simple 
tap, you would see a traditional Uber map with no cars or excessively long 
wait times and another message: “Take Action.  This is what Uber will look 
like in NYC if Mayor de Blasio’s Uber cap bill passes.”5  With the email link, 
it would be easy for you to send a message to stop the proposed bill.6 
With this simple change to its interface,7 Uber caused a deluge of 17,000 
emails to City Hall, demanding a stop to the proposed bill.8  Uber’s actions 
are a striking example of what this Article will define as “Platform Advo-
cacy,” or the ability of internet-based platforms (like Uber, Facebook, 
Airbnb, and Twitter) to mobilize their users to influence lawmakers.9 
                                                          
 1.  Franklin D. Roosevelt: Message for American Education Week, THE AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (Sept. 27, 1938), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15545. 
 2.  Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.face-
book.com/zuck/posts/10104052907253171. 
 3.  See RACHEL PIPAN & KELLY SHEEHAN, SEE WHAT HAPPENS: HOW A COMMUNICATIONS 
CAMPAIGN SAVED UBER BILLIONS 6 (2016), http://www.awpagesociety.com/attach-
ments/bd406d9a80a3bc99f921e9c89d851b912bcdeff7/store/6c6af73b0ab03635b8db18ba490ef6b
3826c92a6f38f8b63904ac2a2247a/final_uber_case.pdf. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Carolyn Said, Airbnb, Uber Cast Themselves as Saviors of the Middle Class, S.F. CHRON. 
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Airbnb-Uber-We-are-the-saviors-of-
the-middle-6620729.php; see also Ted Karczewski, Tech Giants as Lobbyists: Politics Meets the 
Sharing Economy, CONTENT STANDARD (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.skyword.com/contentstand-
ard/marketing/tech-giants-as-lobbyists-politics-meets-the-sharing-economy/. 
 8.  Said, supra note 7; see Matt Flegenheimer, De Blasio Administration Dropping Plan for 
Uber Cap, for Now, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/nyre-
gion/de-blasio-administration-dropping-plan-for-uber-cap-for-now.html?_r=0. 
 9.  Other ways to describe this phenomenon include “weaponizing” the apps or “grass-roots 
for hire.” Edward T. Walker, The Uber-ization of Activism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/opinion/the-uber-ization-of-activism.html?_r=0.  This Arti-
cle adopts the definition of advocacy suggested by sociologists Kenneth Andrews and Bob Edwards.  
Advocacy (or an advocacy organization) is “either promoting or resisting social change that, if im-
plemented, would conflict with the social, cultural, political, or economic interests or values of other 
constituencies and groups.”  Kenneth T. Andrews & Bob Edwards, Advocacy Organizations in the 
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Platform Advocacy may take many forms from direct solicitation of 
user support to the more troubling exploitation of malleable user behavior.  
And, due to platforms’ size and reach, Platform Advocacy can help these 
“modern monopolies”10 create favorable legal environments for themselves, 
thereby strengthening their own dominance in the marketplace.  Unfortu-
nately, this new form of political power has received scant scholarly atten-
tion.11  This Article will address that gap and make four unique contributions. 
In Part I, this Article will define Platform Advocacy.  Part II will place 
Platform Advocacy in context by asserting that when platforms use their po-
sition to manufacture spontaneous support through manipulation of user in-
terfaces and exploitation of consumer biases, their activities are akin to as-
troturfing.12  Astroturfing, an illegitimate form of grassroots advocacy, is 
designed to give the impression of widespread public support or opposition 
to a particular issue when such a concern may not broadly exist.13  Currently, 
there are no federal laws and only a smattering of state laws that address the 
potential threats of astroturfing in the context of Platform Advocacy.14  This 
leaves firms highly dependent on their sense of normative ethics to avoid 
exploiting their unique and powerful positions.15 
                                                          
U.S. Political Process, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 481 (2004).  It is true that traditional media com-
panies and many other businesses have used their position to advocate for certain political positions 
throughout history.  See generally Benjamin I. Page, The Mass Media as Political Actors, 29 PS: 
POL. SCI. & POL. 20 (1996).  However, what distinguishes Platform Advocacy from these activities 
is the scale, reach, and influence internet-based platforms have over their user bases. 
 10.  The term “modern monopolies” was taken from the book, Modern Monopolies.  ALEX 
MOAZED & NICHOLAS L. JOHNSON, MODERN MONOPOLIES: WHAT IT TAKES TO DOMINATE THE 
21ST-CENTURY ECONOMY (2016). 
 11.  There are, however, some excellent papers on the concept of e-democracy and e-legislat-
ing.  See WILLIAM H. DUTTON & MALCOLM PELTU, OXFORD INTERNET INST., RECONFIGURING 
GOVERNMENT–PUBLIC ENGAGEMENTS: ENHANCING THE COMMUNICATIVE POWER OF CITIZENS 
1, 8 (2007), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1295337; K.K. Duvivier, E-Legislating, 92 OR. L. REV. 
9, 10 (2013).  In addition, Elizabeth Pollman’s chapter on regulatory affairs in technology-based 
startups adds a valuable perspective on the political activities and strategies of platforms.  Elizabeth 
Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative Startups, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (D. Gordon Smith & Christine Hurt, eds., forthcoming 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2880818.  
 12.  Jonathan C. Zellner, Note, Artificial Grassroots Advocacy and the Constitutionality of Leg-
islative Identification and Control Measures, 43 CONN. L. REV. 357, 363 (2010).   
 13.  Id. at 362; Ramón Castellblanch, Challenging Pharmaceutical Industry Political Power in 
Maine and Vermont, 28 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 109, 126 (2003) (“Astroturf lobbying is the 
top-down fabrication of the outpourings of letters, faxes, e-mails, phone calls, and personal visits 
characteristic of bottom-up grassroots campaigns.”). 
 14.  Grassroots lobbying is not considered “lobbying” under federal lobbying disclosure laws.  
State lobbying laws may regulate grassroots lobbying somewhat but in a piecemeal fashion.  
EDWARD T. WALKER, GRASSROOTS FOR HIRE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSULTANTS IN AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 201 (2014); see infra Part II. 
 15.  Mary Lyn Stoll, Corporate Political Speech and Moral Obligation, 132 J. BUS. ETHICS 
553, 555 (2015).  For a review of the ethical implications of Platform Advocacy, see Abbey Stemler, 
Todd Haugh, & Joshua Perry, Code of the Platform (2018) (paper on file with the authors).   
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In Part III, this Article will draw upon behavioral public choice theory 
to anticipate Platform Advocacy’s power to influence and mobilize users to 
create favorable legal environments for platforms.  Part III will briefly reflect 
on the history and future of platforms and argue that extreme network and 
data network effects magnify the potential for platforms to harm democratic 
institutions. 
In Part IV, this Article will identify how Platform Advocacy may impair 
the necessary conditions for effective deliberative democracy.16  Deliberative 
democracy requires the thoughtful exchange of reasoning among citizens and 
lawmakers, relying heavily on the cooling influence of representatives and 
their appointees to temper the passions of the public.  Presumably, civil serv-
ants are better positioned to carefully study, deliberate, and make informed 
decisions about a myriad of policy issues than the average voter.  However, 
when citizens are manipulated and lawmakers are inundated or confused by 
their direct messages, the mutual ability of both groups to deliberate is com-
promised. 
Finally, in Parts V and VI, this Article will provide guidance to mitigate 
the negative effects of Platform Advocacy—first, by examining a case study 
from India’s response to Facebook’s campaign for universal limited internet 
access; and second, by offering several recommendations for lawmakers. 
These recommendations pay close attention to political speech protections 
under the First Amendment. 
In the age of social media, fake news, and information glut, it is more 
important than ever to detect and monitor new forms of political power.  This 
Article will contribute to our understanding of one such new form and pro-
vide a way to ensure that consumers, and by extension lawmakers, are not 
improperly influenced by platforms. 
I.  DEFINING PLATFORM ADVOCACY 
Platform Advocacy is action taken by platforms to mobilize their users 
to directly influence lawmakers.  To understand this definition, we first must 
identify the meaning of a platform.17 
                                                          
 16.  This Section follows and expands upon arguments made by Cass Sunstein about how fil-
tered platform content can impair exposure to, exploration of, and deliberation about ideas. CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2009); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED 
DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 47 (2017) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC].  
 17.  MOAZED & JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 29.  The term “platform” is used in multiple con-
texts.  It can refer to a piece of technology (for example, an underlying computer system) or com-
puting services (for example, Amazon Web Services).  The term is also used among software as a 
service (“SaaS”) companies (for example, SalesForce) that offer an internet-based application plat-
form.  These businesses, however, are still linear in that they are selling a product or service to 
consumers directly.  Id. at 32–33.  See also Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms,’ 12 NEW 
MEDIA & SOCIETY 347 (2010) (describing the evolution of the word “platform” in the technology 
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Since the Industrial Revolution and until recently, a majority of the 
world’s most successful businesses (for example, Citigroup, Exxon, and Gen-
eral Electric)18 have incorporated a linear business model.19  That is, they 
primarily produce goods for, or provide services to, intermediaries and cus-
tomers.20  However, since the internet became available in our homes, work-
spaces, and pockets, a massive shift took place in the economy.  The world’s 
largest companies are now primarily built in whole, or in part, on platforms 
(for example, Apple, Amazon, Google,21 and Facebook) and are the titans of 
the twenty-first century.22 
In their book, Modern Monopolies: What It Takes to Dominate the 21st-
Century, entrepreneurs Alex Moazed and Nicholas L. Johnson break down 
platforms into two main types.23  The first type is an exchange platform, 
which helps broker transactions between buyers and sellers by reducing 
search costs and standardizing terms of trade (for example, Uber, Airbnb, and 
Etsy).24  The second is a maker platform, which involves users distributing 
some form of digital content (for example, Apple and YouTube).25   
Regardless of type, when users choose to use platforms, platforms can 
surveille and curate their experiences in unprecedented ways.26  Thus, plat-
forms are in a unique position to capture individual attention and manipulate 
behavior.  Take for instance the popular accommodations app Airbnb.  
Airbnb controls a host’s interaction with a potential guest.  When a host re-
ceives a booking request, Airbnb dictates what information they see about 
the guest, how they can communicate (that is, only via the platform and only 
                                                          
context).  ‘“Platforms’ are ‘platforms’ not necessarily because they allow code to be written or run, 
but because they afford an opportunity to communicate, interact or sell.”  Id. at 351. 
 18.  FINANCIAL TIMES, GLOBAL 500 JUNE 2007 RANKS 1 (2007), http://im.ft-static.com/con-
tent/images/6aec81f8-2bd9-11dc-b498-000b5df10621.pdf. 
 19.  MOAZED & JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 22. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Google is now operated under the umbrella company, Alphabet.  Alyssa Newcomb, Google 
Now Under Umbrella Company Called Alphabet, ABC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/google-now-umbrella-company-called-alpha-
bet/story?id=32998419. 
 22.  Will Oremus, Tech Companies Are Dominating the Stock Market as Never Before, SLATE 
(July 29, 2016, 4:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/mon-
eybox/2016/07/29/the_world_s_5_most_valuable_companies_apple_google_microsoft_ama-
zon_facebook.html; see also Tim Wu, In the Grip of the New Monopolists, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 
2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704635704575604993311538482. 
 23.  MOAZED & JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 43–44. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1628 (2017). 
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with certain information up until a confirmed booking),27 how they eventu-
ally get paid, and, to a degree, how much.28 
With a captivated, dependent, and unsuspecting user base, platforms be-
come the masters of their digital domains.  They are able to use their position 
to encourage and manipulate users to advocate on their behalf.  Platform Ad-
vocacy can occur in various ways, but many cases follow a pattern.  First, the 
platform designs the interface so that users must see information or cues 
about specific legislative, administrative, or other policy issues.  The plat-
form can provide this information in a way that piques curiosity and provokes 
emotions such as outrage.  Second, the platform presents information in a 
light most favorable to it and avoids any suggestion of counterarguments.  
Third, the platform makes it effortless for users to act—for example, with 
“Email Now” buttons29 and online petitions—thereby reducing the burdens 
of advocating on behalf of the company.  To see Platform Advocacy in ac-
tion, we can turn to the day Google went dark. 
On January 17, 2012, Google covered its logo in a black box and showed 
searchers a simple message: “Tell Congress: Please don’t censor the web!”30 
The image aimed to mobilize the public against two bills designed to prevent 
copyright infringement (the PROTECT IP Act (“PIPA”)31 in the Senate and 
the Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”)32 in the House of Representatives).33  
Clicking the logo or blue link on the bottom would lead users to a page where 
they could learn more about the issue and sign a petition.34  Google framed 
PIPA and SOPA as attempts by the government to censor people and “crim-
inalize linking and the fundamental structure of the [i]nternet itself.”35 
                                                          
 27.  For example, Airbnb blocks out phone numbers and email addresses.  Bruce Upbin, How 
Airbnb Hacked the Reach-Around Problem, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2010), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceupbin/2010/12/07/how-airbnb-hacked-the-reach-around-prob-
lem/. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See infra Figure 1. 
 30.  Id.; see infra notes 33–45 and accompanying text.  
 31.  S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 32.  H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 33.  See JONATHAN TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW FACEBOOK, GOOGLE, 
AND AMAZON CORNERED CULTURE AND UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY 127 (2017). 
 34.  Mike Masnick, Google Goes Big with Its SOPA/PIPA Protests; Blacks out Logo, TECHDIRT 
(Jan. 17, 2012, 10:00 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120117/21305017444/google-
goes-big-with-its-sopapipa-protests-blacks-out-logo.shtml. 
 35.  Gautham Nagesh, Google Chairman Says Online Piracy Bill Would “Criminalize” the In-
ternet, THE HILL (Dec. 12, 2011, 7:11 PM) (quoting Eric Schmidt, Google’s Executive Chairman), 
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/198777-google-chairman-says-online-piracy-bill-would-crim-
inalize-linking; see also David Drummond, Don’t Censor the Web, GOOGLE: OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 
17, 2012), https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/dont-censor-web.html.  “Linking” in this con-
text refers to a website connecting a user to another website through a hyperlink. 
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The image was viewed by 1.8 billion36 people and was part of a larger 
campaign by other popular websites, such as Wikipedia and Reddit.37  Due 
in part to Google’s Platform Advocacy, 2,000 calls per second to Congress 
were attempted,38 over 350 thousand emails were sent,39  and 4.5 million 
people signed Google’s petition.40 As a result, Congress quickly withdrew 
the bills.41 














We can apply the typical Platform Advocacy pattern to Google’s cam-
paign.  First, if users wanted to use Google’s search service, they were forced 
to see the black box over the Google logo.  This provocative image encour-
aged users to click to satisfy their curiosity.  Second, Google framed the issue 
in terms of censorship as opposed to the enforcement of property rights and 
prevention of piracy.43  This framing is understandable given the potentially 
                                                          
 36.  TAPLIN, supra note 33, at 127. 
 37.  See Duvivier, supra note 11, at 66; Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory En-
trepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 403–06 (2017). 
 38.  Jenna Wortham, With Twitter, Blackouts and Demonstrations, Web Flexes Its Muscles, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/protests-of-antipi-
racy-bills-unite-web.html. 
 39.  Chenda Ngak, SOPA and PIPA Internet Blackout Aftermath, Staggering Numbers, CBS 
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sopa-and-pipa-internet-blackout-after-
math-staggering-numbers/. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  TAPLIN, supra note 33, at 127. 
 42.  This image was posted by Google on January 17, 2012 and can be found on Wikimedia 
Commons.  File:Google Doodle Censored 2.png, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, https://commons.wiki-
media.org/wiki/File:Google_Doodle_Censored_2.png (Jan. 18, 2012). 
 43.  Jim Abrams, PIPA and SOPA: What You Need to Know, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 
19, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2012/0119/PIPA-and-SOPA-What-you-need-
to-know; Scott Cleland, The Real Reasons Google Killed SOPA/PIPA, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2012), 
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harmful impact PIPA and SOPA could have on Google’s business model in 
terms of enforcement costs and liability.44 But unless users took the initiative 
to research the objectives of the legislation or counterarguments to Google’s 
position, users were not making an informed choice.  Third, users could (and 
many did) simply sign the petition that Google designed to reduce the bur-
dens of advocacy.45 
PIPA and SOPA were certainly controversial bills, and it is possible that 
individuals would have sided with Google’s viewpoint independent of 
Google’s Platform Advocacy.  However, this example demonstrates how 
easy it is for Google, because of its position as a platform, to mobilize users.  
Moving forward, this Article explores this ability and its potential conse-
quences. 
II.  WHEN PLATFORM ADVOCACY BECOMES ASTROTURFING 
From the French Revolution to the #MeToo movement,46 grassroots ac-
tivities have shaped politics and society.47  As suggested by the late William 
Safire, grassroots advocacy is “[t]he ultimate source of power” because it 
appears to capture the natural and independent will of the electorate.48  Un-
fortunately, grassroots advocacy’s “up-from-the-people” imagery, which en-
visions populist responses to the public’s unmet needs and desires, is some-
times more myth than reality.49  This myth is particularly true for grassroots 
                                                          
https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcleland/2012/01/24/the-real-reasons-google-killed-
sopapipa/#34f44cf04530. 
 44.  Cleland, supra note 43. 
 45.  See Deborah Netburn, Google Says 4.5 Million People Signed Anti-SOPA Petition Today, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01/google-anti-sopa-
petition.html. 
 46.  ME TOO, https://metoomvmt.org (last visited Sept. 11, 2018). 
 47.  Jon Van Til et al., Grassroots Social Movements and the Shaping of History, in HANDBOOK 
OF COMMUNITY MOVEMENTS AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS 362 (Ram A. Cnaan & Carl Milofsky 
eds., 2008).  
 48.  WALKER, supra note 14, at 20; WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 289 
(Oxford University Press 2008) (1968).  
 49.  WALKER, supra note 14, at 20 (stating that grassroots advocacy “carries an ‘up-from-the-
people’ meaning that is deeply rooted in American politics and culture, in which the porousness of 
the American state and rich traditions of civic organizing continually reaffirm the value of public 
engagement independent of the state and the marketplace”). 
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forms of lobbying50 because special interest groups and corporations are bet-
ter equipped to fuel campaigns.51  While grassroots lobbying is effective,52 
when it is orchestrated by businesses, its authenticity and thus its helpfulness 
for encouraging meaningful deliberation is reduced.53  Further, this form of 
astroturfing mostly escapes a range of federal lobbying regulations designed 
to curtail the manipulation of citizens for political gains.54 
This Part first details the differences between grassroots lobbying and 
astroturfing and describes how Platform Advocacy can slip into the latter.  It 
then briefly describes the regulatory environment surrounding these activi-
ties. 
A.  The Differences Between Grassroots and Astroturf 
While the origins of the term “grassroots” are difficult to pin down,55 it 
is not difficult to envision what is meant by the term.  Images of groundswells 
                                                          
 50.  Contrary to grassroots lobbying, direct lobbying involves companies’ or organizations’ 
“attempts to influence a legislative body through communication with a member or employee of a 
legislative body, or with a government official who participates in formulating legislation.”  “Di-
rect” and “Grass Roots” Lobbying Defined, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/direct-
and-grass-roots-lobbying-defined (last updated Aug. 20, 2018). 
 51.  WALKER, supra note 14, at 20–21.  Walker identifies the field of consulting firms that offer 
services to create grassroots lobbying campaigns as “grassroots for hire.”  Id. at 21.   
 52.  See, e.g., Daniel E. Bergan, Does Grassroots Lobbying Work? A Field Experiment Meas-
uring the Effects of an E-Mail Lobbying Campaign on Legislative Behavior, 37 AM. POL. RES. 327, 
327 (2009) (finding that “lobbying by e-mail has a substantial influence on legislative voting be-
havior”). 
 53.  For example, there are sincere beliefs among supporters of President Trump that protests 
by people who oppose President Trump’s polices are paid.  Patrick J. Kiger, Do Paid Protesters 
Really Exist?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (May 30, 2017), https://people.howstuffworks.com/do-paid-pro-
testers-really-exist.htm.  And, President Trump stated he believed this to be true even though it was 
thoroughly discredited.  Steve Contorno, Trump Says Clinton and Obama Paid People to Cause 
Violence at His Rallies, POLITIFACT (Oct. 20, 2016, 2:29 AM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2016/oct/20/trump-says-clinton-and-obama-caused-violence-his-r/ (reporting that at 
the final presidential debate in 2016, President Trump stated, “‘I was wondering what happened 
with my rally in Chicago and other rallies where we had such violence.  [Clinton is] the one, and 
Obama, that caused the violence.  They hired people, they paid them $1,500, and they’re on tape 
saying, be violent, cause fights, do bad things’”).  This belief surrounding paid protestors delegiti-
mizes arguments made by people who oppose President Trump and discourages respectful and 
meaningful debate. 
 54.  Several states do regulate grassroots lobbying.  For example, in the state of Washington, 
sponsors of grassroots lobbying campaigns who spend $1,000 in three months or $500 in any one 
month must report their activities to the state.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.640 (2012).  For 
a comprehensive overview of state regulations, see JEFFREY MILYO, INST. FOR JUSTICE, MOWING 
DOWN THE GRASSROOTS: HOW GRASSROOTS LOBBYING DISCLOSURE LAWS SUPPRESS POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 9–11 (2010), https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/washington/mow-
ing_down_the-grassroots.pdf. 
 55.  See SAFIRE, supra note 48, at 289 (explaining the origins of the word “grassroots”); Ryan 
Sager, Opinion, Keep off the Astroturf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, at A27.  Texas Senator Lloyd 
Bentsen is credited with first using the term “Astroturf” in 1985 to refer to manufactured grassroots 
activities: “A fellow from Texas can tell the difference between grassroots and Astroturf.” Zellner, 
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of support for particular issues in the form of marches, petitions, letters, 
emails, and Twitter campaigns come to mind.56 Clear examples include the 
Black Lives Matter movement of 2013 and the “resistance movement” trig-
gered by the election of President Donald Trump.57  Such activities are often 
difficult to ignore because they carpet mainstream media and capture public 
intrigue. 
However, not all grassroots movements, and in particular grassroots lob-
bying campaigns, are what they seem.  In today’s internet-enabled environ-
ment, distinguishing natural from synthetic roots is more difficult than ever. 
Organizations can covertly stimulate tweets and social media posts via bots 
and other techniques.58 They can bury opposing viewpoints with clickbait 
and distractions.59 For example, during the 2012 Mexican election, the Insti-
tutional Revolutionary Party used bots to create Twitter trends that fired up 
public interest about irrelevant issues and controversies in order to distract 
people from stories that were harmful to the party.60 
In an instant, organizations can disseminate calls-to-action to millions 
based on misleading information that can lead to actual protests.61 Such forms 
                                                          
supra note 12, at 362.  At the time, he was referring to constituent mail generated by insurance 
companies.  Id. 
 56.  The IRS defines “grass roots lobbying communication” as “any attempt to influence any 
legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof.”  
26 CFR § 56.4911-2(b)(2) (2017).  This definition has three distinct elements: (1) the communica-
tion “[r]efers to specific legislation”; (2) “[r]eflects a view on such legislation”; and (3) “[e]ncour-
ages the recipient of the communication to take action with respect to such legislation.”  Id. 
 57.  Joshua Holland, Your Guide to the Sprawling New Anti-Trump Resistance Movement, 
NATION (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/your-guide-to-the-sprawling-new-anti-
trump-resistance-movement/; David Weigel, Sidelined Democrats Let Grass Roots “Resistance” 
Lead the Way on Health Care Fight, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2017), http://www.chicagotrib-
une.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-health-care-democrats-20170324-story.html; see Eli Rosen-
berg, Protest Grows "Out of Nowhere" at Kennedy Airport After Iraqis Are Detained, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/nyregion/jfk-protests-trump-refugee-
ban.html.  
 58.  See, e.g., Molly K. McKew, How Twitter Bots and Trump Fans Made #ReleaseTheMemo 
Go Viral, POLITICO MAG. (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.politico.com/maga-
zine/story/2018/02/04/trump-twitter-russians-release-the-memo-216935 (discussing how a compu-
tational propaganda campaign largely driven by bots made a hashtag about a Republican-authored 
memorandum on improper FBI behavior go viral on Twitter); George Monbiot, The Need to Protect 
the Internet from “Astroturfing” Grows Ever More Urgent, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2011), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2011/feb/23/need-to-protect-internet-
from-astroturfing (describing how companies attempt to manufacture online personas to simulate 
crowds of supporters). 
 59.  See, e.g., Reply All: #112 The Prophet, GIMLET MEDIA (Dec. 15, 2017), https://gimlet-
media.com/episode/112-the-prophet/. 
 60.  Emma Woollacott, Why Fake Twitter Accounts Are a Political Problem, NEWSTATESMAN 
(May 28, 2014), http://www.newstatesman.com/sci-tech/2014/05/why-fake-twitter-accounts-are-
political-problem.  
 61.  See, e.g., Maya Kosoff, How Russia Secretly Orchestrated Dozens of U.S. Protests, 
VANITY FAIR (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/10/how-russia-secretly-or-
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of manipulation and deception are harmful to public debate and consensus 
building, revealing less the will of the people and more the will of the tech-
nically savvy.  They, therefore, can subvert the goals of a deliberative de-




The wide range of astroturfing activities makes it challenging to identify 
universal characteristics; however, there are two main dimensions that can be 
used to assess the legitimacy of grassroots lobbying: consent and sincerity of 
beliefs.62 The following Sections assess and describe each of these dimen-
sions at the individual user level in the context of Platform Advocacy. 
1.  The Consent Dimension 
In order for Platform Advocacy to move toward authenticity, users must 
voluntarily give their consent before their names or actions are associated 
with the platform’s position.  Unfortunately, there are several situations in 
which informed consent may be absent in the Platform Advocacy context. 
                                                          
chestrated-dozens-of-us-protests (describing how Russian agents used Facebook to organize pro-
tests in order to encourage political division in the U.S.); Rebecca Shapiro, Chobani Sues Alex Jones 
for Posting Vicious Fake News Stories, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/entry/chobani-sues-alex-jones-fake-news_us_58feaec6e4b06b9cb9198b65 (describ-
ing a boycott of Chobani yogurt based on a YouTube video and tweets by Alex Jones, a well-known 
conspiracy theorist).  Note that astroturfing, as it applies to online activities, is sometimes called 
“CyberTurfing.”  Mark Leiser defines CyberTurfing as “a form of stealth marketing designed to 
appear to be as a kind of bottom-up activism that in reality is powered by someone else behind the 
scenes.”  Mark Leiser, AstroTurfing, “CyberTurfing” and Other Online Persuasion Campaigns, 7 
EUR. J. L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2016).   
 62.  See supra Figure 2. 
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Most egregiously, platforms can make it appear that users have given 
consent to advocacy even when they in fact have not.  In this situation, there 
is zero transparency.  For example, the Wall Street Journal (“WSJ”) reported 
that thousands of comments on federal agency websites are posted (most 
likely by bots) without the user’s permission.63  This was particularly true 
during the lead-up to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) 
controversial decision to repeal net-neutrality regulations put in place during 
President Barack Obama’s administration.  According to the WSJ, more than 
seventy percent of comments related to the FCC rules were falsely submit-
ted.64  Though many of these comments came from a Russia-based mailing 
address,65 platforms too have the same capability to use personal information 
in improper ways.66 And, unlike other forms of Platform Advocacy, imper-
sonating users in this way would likely be a felony.67   
Similar to pure lack of consent, situations where platforms give users no 
choice but to advocate on their behalf pushes advocacy toward astroturfing.  
For example, Uber could require a user to send a message to their lawmaker 
before they could get a ride.  In this hypothetical situation, the user’s sincerity 
would be questionable.  This is especially true since many platforms, such as 
Google, Facebook, and Uber, provide needed services (namely, information 
and transportation).   
An easier and less sinister way platforms could reduce the consent di-
mension of advocacy is through punishment.68  Punishments, such as denial 
of privileges, are common when users do not agree to certain terms and con-
ditions.  For example, YouTube could make viewers watch a short political 
message and then complete a simple poll before they could move on to their 
next cat video.  That form of punishment would likely have a great impact on 
                                                          
 63.  James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overberg, Millions of People Post Comments on Federal Reg-
ulations. Many Are Fake, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/millions-of-
people-post-comments-on-federal-regulations-many-are-fake-1513099188.  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Brian Fung, FCC Net Neutrality Process “Corrupted” by Fake Comments and Vanishing 
Consumer Complaints, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/11/24/fcc-net-neutrality-process-corrupted-by-fake-com-
ments-and-vanishing-consumer-complaints-officials-say/?utm_term=.f65a3b3abcff. 
 66. This Article is in no way suggesting that the platforms discussed in this Article have inten-
tionally submitted false comments.   
 67.  18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the exec-
utive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and will-
fully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation . . . shall 
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than [five] years or, if the offense involves interna-
tional or domestic terrorism (as defined in [S]ection 2331), imprisoned not more than [eight] years, 
or both.”). 
 68.  For example, Facebook’s manipulation of voter behavior described in infra Part II.A.1.b 
could be an example of public shaming—a form of punishment.  If your name was not listed on 
other’s pages because you did not vote, you may feel compelled to vote even though you do not 
wish to or have a particular affinity for any of the candidates. 
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political behavior.69 Consent may also be improperly obtained when plat-
forms exploit known flaws in decision making.  As described in Part III, this 
manipulation is largely unrestrained and unnoticed, making it the most con-
cerning method of Platform Advocacy.70 
From forged comments to the use of proverbial sticks and the exploita-
tion of cognitive biases, platforms have a wide range of methods at their dis-
posal to push the consent dimension of advocacy toward astroturfing.  Fur-
ther, the use of these methods is low-cost and effective because platforms 
mediate user interactions, which gives them power to control and influence 
behavior.71 But, as we will see, platforms can abuse this power, especially by 
those firms with questionable ethics.72 
2.  The Sincerity Dimension 
A key ingredient to the effectiveness of grassroots advocacy is its au-
thenticity.  When large swaths of the population endogenously come together 
to advocate for or against a policy, lawmakers take notice because the “will 
of the people” is manifest.73 However, when the advocates do not actually 
hold the beliefs they agitate, advocacy trends toward astroturfing.  There are 
several reasons why a user may not actually hold a position to which they 
voluntarily lend their name, time, and energy.  The following Sections de-
scribe these reasons. 
a.  Direct Incentives 
First, a person may voluntarily consent to advocate on behalf of a plat-
form if the platform provides a wanted reward for the advocacy.  Payment 
for protest in whatever form is classic astroturfing and immediately raises 
questions of legitimacy.74  As with the use of direct incentives to get users’ 
                                                          
 69.  The use of carrots, such as rewards and extra benefits, are assessed as a part of the sincerity 
dimension described in the Section below. 
 70.  See infra Part III.  
 71.  See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1002–03 
(2014) (describing how the “mediated consumer” is the consumer of the future in that they will 
“approach[] the marketplace through technology”). 
 72.  Uber, for example, has had a number of ethical lapses.  Kate Taylor, 40 of the Biggest 
Scandals in Uber’s History, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-
company-scandals-and-controversies-2017-11 (linking to various articles related to Uber’s ethical 
lapses).  
 73.  See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (“The maintenance of the opportunity for 
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and 
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Re-
public, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931))); Stacey D. Schesser, Note, A New Domain for Public Speech: Opening 
Public Spaces Online, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1791, 1792 (2006). 
 74.  Accusations of paid protestors since the election of President Donald Trump have been 
widespread, including by the President himself, but largely unfounded.  Elana Schor, No Evidence 
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contact information or to recommend a product or service to a friend, plat-
forms can easily use similar incentives in exchange for advocacy.75 
b.  Concealment 
The second way platforms encourage people to advocate for positions 
they do not actually support is by concealing pertinent information, such as 
underlying motivations and opposing viewpoints.  Though not a platform, 
take for instance Intuit’s campaign to stop proposed bills that would simplify 
federal tax filings.  Intuit hired a public relations firm to encourage commu-
nity leaders to speak out about the proposed bills.76  The community leaders 
were often unaware of the bills’ content or Intuit’s interest in them, and when 
questioned, many of the leaders who advocated against the bill changed their 
minds.77 
In the Platform Advocacy context, in 2014, Lyft and Uber were in a 
heated battle with regulators after two bills78 toughening ride-sharing require-
ments were introduced in the California statehouse.79  Lyft partnered with 
Phone2Action, a company that facilitates contact between citizens and law-
makers, to capture the attention of its users.80  With Phone2Action’s help, 
Lyft successfully targeted its passengers and drivers to defeat portions of the 
bills that would require driver background checks and drug testing.81  Cus-
tomers were never told, however, that the proposed bills could actually pro-
tect them.82 
                                                          
Town Hall Protesters Are Being Paid, POLITICO (Feb. 24, 2017, 5:28 AM), http://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2017/02/town-hall-protesters-paid-no-evidence-235321; see supra note 53.  
 75.  For example, Uber offers credits for referring others to the platform.  Earning Free Rides, 
UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/27ecd6af-4929-4c53-a81c-f9fbf2432fd4 (last visited Sept. 11, 
2018).  Airbnb does the same.  Airbnb Referral Program Terms and Conditions, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/2269/airbnb-referral-program-terms-and-conditions (last up-
dated May 10, 2018). 
 76.  Liz Day, TurboTax Maker Linked to “Grassroots” Campaign Against Free, Simple Tax 
Filing, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 14, 2014, 9:33 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/turbotax-maker-
linked-to-grassroots-campaign-against-free-simple-tax-filing.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  A.B. 2293, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); A.B. 612, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2013). 
 79.  Carolyn Said, Uber, Lyft, Airbnb Harness Users to Lobby Lawmakers for Them, SFGATE 
(Jan. 11, 2015), https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Uber-Lyft-Airbnb-harness-users-to-
lobby-6005562.php. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.  When passengers turned on the Lyft app, they saw lawmakers’ contact information and 
suggested language.  Id.  
 82.  The two bills Lyft “aggressively” lobbied against would have mandated more extensive 
background checks, insurance requirements, and drug testing.  Id.; Josh Richman, Uber, Lyft, Side-
car Fight to Block New California Regulations, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/08/13/uber-lyft-sidecar-fight-to-block-new-california-regu-
lations/; see also supra note 78.  Since 2014, Lyft used Phone2Action’s tools to modify their user 
interface and encourage people to contact their lawmakers in more than fifty states.  Lyft: Supporting 
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c.  Exploiting Cognitive Biases 
Also discussed more fully in Part III, platforms can exploit known cog-
nitive biases, such as herd behavior,83 to encourage users to take action even 
when they do not particularly care about an issue.  For example, in India, 
Facebook attempted to mobilize its user base to encourage regulators to allow 
its Free Basics program.  Free Basics would give complimentary internet ac-
cess to a limited number of websites throughout India.84  After being forced 
to see information about Free Basics when logging on to Facebook, many 
users found that lingering on the information page too long caused Facebook 
to send a notification to all of the user’s friends that they contacted their law-
makers about Free Basics, which in turn encouraged others to send messages 
to lawmakers.85  This extreme example of exploiting the herding effect likely 
led to inauthentic support for the issue. 
Government policies profoundly shape businesses; thus, it is well within 
businesses’ rights to encourage their users to publicly support them in order 
to create favorable regulations.  However, when the consent dimension of 
Platform Advocacy trends toward acquiescence or the sincerity dimension 
falls toward disingenuousness, Platform Advocacy can be detrimental to so-
ciety.86  The lack of a clear regulatory framework to protect citizens and law-
makers from such forms of astroturfing compounds these harms. 
B.  Regulatory Environment of Grassroots Lobbying 
The federal government has regulated lobbying activities since 1876, 
when the House of Representatives first passed a resolution requiring lobby-
ists to register with the House Clerk.87  After World War II, Congress passed 
                                                          
the Sharing Economy, PHONE2ACTION, https://phone2action.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/01/P2A_Client_Lyft_CaseStudy_Redesign_F2.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2018). 
 83.  With herd behavior, people simply follow along with what other people do as opposed to 
using their own judgment.  Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and 
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 993–94 (1992); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Deliberative Trouble?, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 82–83 (2000) (referring to herding as “informational 
cascades”).  “A common error arising across various digital media platforms comes from our reli-
ance on the repetition heuristic.  We deploy this mental shortcut believing that more people report 
a claim, the greater its credibility.”  Leiser, supra note 61, at 5 (citing Timur Kuran & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999)). 
 84.  See infra Part V. 
 85.  Rahul Bhatia, The Inside Story of Facebook’s Biggest Setback, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/12/facebook-free-basics-india-zuckerberg; 
see also Matt Stempeck, Are Uber and Facebook Turning Users into Lobbyists? HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Aug. 11, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/08/are-uber-and-facebook-turning-users-into-lobbyists. 
 86.  For a complete discussion of these harms, see infra Part IV. 
 87.  CRAIG HOLMAN, PUB. CITIZEN, ORIGINS, EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT 2–3 (2006) (citing Stacie Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Note, Protect-
ing the Right to Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency Fee Prohibition Violates the Constitution, 
35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559, 569 (1998)), http://www.consumerwatch.org/documents/Ori-
gins%20of%20Lobbying%20Disclosure%20Act.pdf. 
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a comprehensive lobbying statute, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 
of 1946 (“FRLA”),88 aimed at further registration and disclosure of lobbying 
activities.89  The FRLA included grassroots lobbying in its gamut.  It required 
companies to disclose expenditures related to influencing federal legislation 
through “direct communication” or with “direct pressure[]” on members of 
Congress.90  The FRLA, however, was repealed and replaced in 1995 by the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act (“LDA”),91 which did not contain a grassroots lob-
bying provision.92  According to the LDA’s legislative history, Congress was 
concerned that disclosure requirements related to grassroots lobbying would 
brush too closely against First Amendment protections.93  Since 1995, several 
attempts were made at the federal level to require disclosure of payments and 
expenditures for grassroots or astroturf lobbying, but all failed.94 
                                                          
 88.  Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 839 (repealed 1995).  
 89.  HOLMAN, supra note 87, at 2–3. 
 90.  United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620, 623–24 (1954). 
 91.  2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614 (2012). 
 92.  HOLMAN, supra note 87, at 8, 16. 
 93.  GUIDE TO INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYING IN THE UNITED STATES 385 (Burdett A. 
Loomis et al. eds., 2012).  Jeanne Woods testified on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union 
and argued the disclosure requirements would “infringe[] [upon] the right of associational privacy 
and would likely deter many individuals and small groups from participating in the public debate.  
As presently drafted, we do not believe this measure would pass constitutional muster.”  Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Govern-
mental Relations of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 255 (1993) (statement of Jeanne M. 
Woods, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).  There, however, is one major ex-
ception to this for 501(c)(3) organizations, which are non-profit organizations that are exempt from 
federal income taxes.  The LDA imposes a disclosure requirement and a cap on grassroots lobbying 
for organizations that choose to lobby under Section 501(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, but this 
election is not required if the non-profit chooses not to participate in grassroots lobbying activities.  
I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012); NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, TAKING THE 501(H) ELECTION, 
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/taking-the-501h-election (last visited Sept. 11, 2018); 
VENABLE LLP, ASSOC. OF CORP. COUNS., LOBBYING: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR 501(C)(3) 
ORGANIZATIONS? (2011), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcoun-
sel/lwdimf501c3o.cfm?makepdf=1.  
 94.  A proposed amendment to the LDA included grassroots lobbying, defined as “the volun-
tary efforts of members of the general public to communicate their own views on an issue to Federal 
officials or to encourage other members of the general public to do the same.”  S. 1, 110th Cong. 
§ 220(a)(2) (as introduced to the Senate on Jan. 4, 2007).  The amendment would have required 
lobbyists to register grassroots activity “[no] later than 45 days after a grassroots lobbying firm first 
is retained by a client to engage in paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying.”  Id. § 220(b)(2); 
see also Zellner, supra note 12, 365–67.  Amendment No. 20 to the LDA struck down this proposal.  
153 CONG. REC. S647–65 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 2007).  There was concern that reporting requirements 
would have a “chilling effect” on constitutionally protected political speech.  Id. at S649–650.  The 
congressional record shows that lawmakers considered the term “grassroots lobbying” broader than 
necessary to protect Congress from “Astroturf campaigns,” and Senators reasoned that the Supreme 
Court would eventually rule it unconstitutional.  Id. at S648; see also JACK MASKELL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33794, GRASSROOTS LOBBYING: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS 2 (2008), https://www.everycrsre-
port.com/files/20080226_RL33794_49f42760dd1d784919ab547237248db6838c0791.pdf (de-
scribing the 109th and 110th Congresses’ attempts to regulate activities intended to stimulate grass-
roots lobbying).  
 122 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:105 
In contrast to the dearth of federal regulations, many states require some 
sort of reporting or registration requirement for grassroots lobbying.  The 
trigger for these disclosures varies dramatically.  In some states, it is based 
on the amount spent to indirectly influence lawmakers;95 in others, it is based 
on the activity itself without regard to a spending threshold.96  For states with 
spending thresholds, Platform Advocacy would rarely trigger disclosure re-
quirements because platforms can engage in advocacy at little to no cost; 
computer code need only be changed once to alter user interaction with the 
platform, and transmission is effortless.97  Even for the states that do require 
disclosure based on the advocacy itself, few people actually seek out dis-
closed information.98  Thus, disclosure does little to deter artificially stimu-
lated grassroots campaigns; if no one sees that a campaign is sponsored by a 
platform, they are unlikely to perceive it as inauthentic.  In addition, those 
who seek out such information are more likely to be passionate about the 
opposing side of whatever is at issue.  As a result, there will be little deliber-
ation among the two sides. 
Disclaimer notices detailing who sponsored a particular request for par-
ticipation are more effective at curtailing the harms presented by Platform 
Advocacy, because the public can quickly assess the credibility of claims for 
themselves.99  However, under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002,100 disclaimer notices only apply to communications made by “political 
                                                          
 95.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 86115(b) (West 2017) (imposing a $5,000 threshold for grassroots 
lobbying expenditures in a calendar quarter); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 317 (2016) (imposing a 
$15,000 threshold for indirect lobbying expenses per calendar month); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-
6(I) (LexisNexis 2016) (imposing a $2,500 threshold for advertising lobbying expenses in a calen-
dar year); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-285 (2017) (imposing a $3,000 threshold for a ninety-day period 
for grassroots lobbying expenses). 
 96.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.045(2) (West 2014) (requiring reporting for any person who is em-
ployed and receives payment for lobbying); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.473 (West 2015) (requiring re-
porting for anyone employed as an executive lobbyist, judicial lobbyist, elected local government 
official lobbyist, or legislative lobbyist); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1 (LexisNexis 2018) (requir-
ing registration of any person employed by any other person in a representative capacity regarding 
legislation or state action). 
 97.  If opportunity costs are not considered.   
 98.  See DICK M. CARPENTER II, INST. FOR JUSTICE, DISCLOSURE COSTS: UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 4 (2007), http://ij.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/03/DisclosureCosts.pdf (arguing that disclosure does not make voters more trusting or 
better informed).  See generally Zellner, supra note 12.   
 99.  ROBERT WECHSLER, CITY ETHICS, INC., THE REGULATION OF LOCAL LOBBYING 62, 64–
65 (2016), http://www.cityethics.org/files/Regulation-of-Local-Lobbying-Robert-Wechsler.pdf;  
Zellner, supra note 12, at 390, 394–95 (arguing that the McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), 
suggests that “Congress can require identity disclosure because it will provide the public with mean-
ingful information with which to evaluate Astroturf campaigns” and “that grassroots lobbying dis-
closure laws simply seek to make available information that may be of political significance to 
curious citizens, but that is not readily accessible in the absence of such requirements” (emphasis 
added)). 
 100.  Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 36 and 52 
U.S.C.). 
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committees,” which platforms are not,101 or “electioneering communica-
tion[s],” which are specifically limited to communications about clearly iden-
tified candidates for federal office and not policy issues at the heart of most 
grassroots campaigns.102  Furthermore, even if indirect pressure were subject 
to disclaimer notice requirements, platforms might avoid such requirements 
for ads that qualify as “small items” or displays, such as tweets and Facebook 
posts, which do not have to include disclaimer language.103 
Most states have disclaimer laws, but they are often riddled with excep-
tions and outdated for the digital age.  According to the National Conference 
of State Legislatures (“NCSL”), forty-two states have disclaimer laws for po-
litical advertisements.104  The laws cover advertisements through traditional 
forums (for example, print, newspaper, and billboard), but many are opaque 
about disclosure requirements for internet advertisements.105  Some states 
have a catch-all that encompasses the internet. For example, in 2014 the 
NCSL argued that under Idaho law, internet communications presumably fall 
                                                          
 101.  Political committees are defined as:  
(A) any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contribu-
tions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures 
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year; or (B) any separate segregated 
fund established under the provisions of [S]ection 30118(b) of this title; or (C) any local 
committee of a political party which receives contributions aggregating in excess of 
$5,000 during a calendar year, or makes payments exempted from the definition of con-
tribution or expenditure as defined in paragraphs (8) and (9) aggregating in excess of 
$5,000 during a calendar year, or makes contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 
during a calendar year or makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a 
calendar year. 
52 U.S.C. § 30101(4) (2012). 
 102.  11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (2017). In addition, electioneering communications are those that 
are: 
publicly distributed within 60 days before a general election for the office sought by the 
candidate; or within 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or 
caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought 
by the candidate, and the candidate referenced is seeking the nomination of that political 
party . . . [and] [i]s targeted to the relevant electorate, in the case of a candidate for Senate 
or the House of Representatives.   
Id. 
 103.  See id. § 110.11(f)(1)(i)–(ii).  Even though the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) has 
not determined whether digital ads qualify under the “small items” exception, Facebook has avoided 
requiring such disclaimers.  Issie Lapowsky, Why Facebook Will Struggle to Regulate Political Ads, 
WIRED (Sept. 22, 2017, 6:24 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-facebook-will-struggle-to-
regulate-political-ads/. 
 104.  Austin Graham, Paid for by Whom? Disclaimer Requirements in the Digital Age, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURE BLOG (July 17, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2014/07/17/paid-for-
by-whom-disclaimer-requirements-in-the-digital-age.aspx. 
 105.  Id. 
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under “any other type of general public political advertising.”106  A dozen 
states have explicit disclaimer laws for internet advertisements.107 
Lastly, if grassroots campaigns shift into astroturfing by relying on fake 
news stories or other deceptive propaganda, there is very little that can cur-
rently be done to regulate them.  The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) 
jurisdiction, as it relates to deceptive advertising, only applies to activities 
designed to make consumers purchase something but not to activities that 
make consumers contact their lawmakers.108 
States have tried to target fake news stories and other deceptive propa-
ganda by implementing false statement laws and imposing standards for truth 
in political advertising.  Most states have laws requiring truthfulness in state-
ments relating to the voting process,109 the substance of the election,110 or 
some combination thereof.111 However, the impact of these laws has been 
limited because of the judicial protection afforded to political speech.112  For 
example, in Nevada Press Ass’n v. Nevada Commission on Ethics,113 Ne-
vada’s false statement law was ruled unconstitutional because it permitted 
punishment of protected First Amendment political speech, and its abbrevi-
ated dispute resolution procedures violated due process requirements.114  Fur-
thermore, state statutes that were written before the modern internet may not 
be broad enough to encompass false statements and deceptive tactics 
                                                          
 106.  Id.; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-6614A (2014). 
 107.  Megan Moore, St. Admin. and Veterans’ Aff. Interim Committee, Briefing on Laws Re-
lated to Campaign Advertising Disclaimers in Other States 5, 8 (2012), http://leg.mt.gov/con-
tent/Committees/Interim/2011-2012/State-Administration-and-Veterans-Affairs/Meeting-Docu-
ments/April%202012/OTHER%20STATES%20ANON.pdf. 
 108.  15 U.S.C. § 456(2) (2012).  The FTC has authority to regulate “persons, partnerships, or 
corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”  Id. 
 109.  These laws prohibit false statements regarding matters like registration qualifications, iden-
tification requirements, and polling place locations.  For example, Virginia makes it a misdemeanor 
to “communicate to a registered voter, by any means, false information, knowing the same to be 
false, intended to impede the voter in the exercise of his right to vote.”  VA. CODE. ANN. § 24.2-
1005.1 (2016).  
 110.  These laws prohibit false statements regarding candidates and political issues.  For exam-
ple, Alaska makes it a misdemeanor to “knowingly make[] a communication” that contains “false 
factual information relating to a candidate for an election.”  ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.014(a)(3) 
(2016). 
 111.  COMMON CAUSE ET AL., DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 2.0: LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES 5 
(2008), https://www.commoncause.org/resource/deceptive-practices-2-0-legal-and-policy-re-
sponses/. 
 112.  See, e.g., id. at 6; Amy Sullivan, Truth in Advertising? Not for Political Ads, TIME (Sept. 
23, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1843796,00.html.  
 113.  No. CV-S-02-1195-LDG (RJJ), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4923 (D. Nev. Mar. 26, 2005). 
 114.  Id. at *9–19.  
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online.115  Instead, for example, they might only prohibit communications via 
leaflets or phone calls.116 
As a result of the insufficiency of federal regulations and patchwork of 
state rules, it is generally lawful for companies to directly or indirectly re-
quest users to advocate for a particular candidate or policy.  However, with 
new forms of digital communication (for example, texts, emails, and online 
comment submissions), it is easier than ever before for individual voices to 
be influenced and heard by lawmakers. 
III.  UNRESTRAINED AND UNNOTICED 
The previous Part identified, in broad strokes, how to detect astroturfing 
in the context of Platform Advocacy and described how such behavior is 
largely unregulated.  This Part focuses on the subtler, yet perhaps most pow-
erful and ethically dubious, aspects of Platform Advocacy.  In particular, how 
in unique and unprecedented ways platforms can and do exploit cognitive 
biases among users.  These shrewd forms of manipulation, which again are 
enabled by modern technology, can profoundly impact political participation. 
To demonstrate these propositions, this Part first discusses the role of 
behavioral economics in the context of political participation.  The remaining 
Section applies the insights of behavioral public choice theory to Platform 
Advocacy. 
A.  Behavioral Public Choice Theory and Platform Advocacy 
Developed by Nobel Laureate James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, 
public choice theory applies the tools and methods of economic theory to 
politics and government.117  It suggests that citizens are rational and self-
interested and that they make decisions to advance their own private interests 
in order to maximize utility.118  This often means that individuals may decide 
not to participate in democratic activities because the costs of participation 
outweigh the benefits.119  As a result, apathy molds the law around special 
                                                          
 115.  COMMON CAUSE ET AL., supra note 111, at 5. 
 116. Id. 
 117.  JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 3–9 (1962); 
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE–II 13 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984). 
 118.  EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE–A PRIMER 25 (2012). 
 119.  See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 45–47 (1957); Mi-
chael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public 
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 189 (1990).  Public choice theory is not the 
only way to look at political participation.  People engage in the political process for a variety of 
reasons, including the “Kantian” desire to act in a way that you want other people to act.  GEOFFREY 
BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL 
PREFERENCE 1–18 (1993); A.C. Ewing, What Would Happen If Everybody Acted Like Me? 28 
PHILOSOPHY 16, 16 (1953); Joshua Harder & Jon A. Krosnick, Why Do People Vote? A Psycholog-
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interests.120  However, when conceptions of what is in their or society’s best 
interest are influenced by platforms and the barriers to action are low, people 
will more readily act without considering the pros and cons of their choices.  
The field of behavioral economics can shed light on why this is the case.121 
Behavioral economics rejects ideas of rational actors seeking to opti-
mize their utility and focuses, instead, on how “choice behavior diverges 
from the assumptions of neoclassical economics (and more generally, the ne-
oclassical paradigm)—whether or not these factors are psychological, socio-
logical, anthropological, or others.”122  The application of behavioral eco-
nomics to public choice theory led to the development of behavioral public 
choice theory (“BPCT”).123 
With the help of BPCT, we can see the confluence of both identification 
and exploitation of consumer vulnerabilities.  The first Section below identi-
fies some of these consumer vulnerabilities, and the second Section describes 
how platforms could exploit them. 
1.  The Types of Consumer Vulnerabilities 
Becoming an informed political actor takes effort, and because of the 
relatively low personal stakes involved in political participation, the failure 
                                                          
ical Analysis of the Causes of Voter Turnout,  64 J. SOC. ISSUES 525, 536 (2008); Daniel H. Low-
enstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory 
and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 592–93 (1982). For the sake of argument this 
Article focuses on the explanations provided by public choice theory and behavioral economics. 
 120.  Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: 
A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 919 (1994).   
 121.  For an overview of behavioral economics and the law, see generally Christine Jolls et al., 
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).  
 122.  Amitai Etzioni, Behavioral Economics: Toward a New Paradigm, 55 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 1099, 1100 (2011).  “Neoclassical economics” is a complex concept but often calls to 
mind the ideas that individuals are rational actors and make decisions based on what will maximize 
benefits for them.  Christian Arnsperger & Yanis Varoufakis, What Is Neoclassical Economics?  
The Three Axioms Responsible for Its Theoretical Oeuvre, Practical Irrelevance and, thus, Discur-
sive Power, 53 PANOECONOMICUS 5, 5, 13 (2006) (describing how neoclassical economics is mis-
understood and defining the field).  
 123.  Gary M. Lucas, Jr. & Slavisa Tasic, Behavioral Public Choice and the Law, 118 W. VA. 
L. REV. 199, 202 (2015) (“Behavioral public choice is both an extension of and a reaction to behav-
ioral economics . . . .”). 
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to exert effort increases less than thoughtful behavior.124  In the Platform Ad-
vocacy context, there are many ways platforms can encourage people to take 
political action.125  This Section outlines four examples. 
a.  Intention Heuristic 
Heuristics are mental shortcuts that allow people to quickly and effi-
ciently make decisions; however, they can also introduce errors.126  The in-
tention heuristic is a proxy that leads people to believe that good things flow 
from good intentions and bad things flow from bad intentions.127  Therefore, 
if people trust a platform, which they generally do,128 they will think the pol-
icy positions of those platforms are good.  Take Lyft, for example.  It is gen-
erally viewed as the more ethical and “friendly company” when compared to 
Uber.129  Therefore, when asked to support legislation protecting it, Lyft pas-
sengers are less likely to take the time to consider the costs and benefits of a 
given position and will take action if it is sufficiently easy to do so.130 
                                                          
 124.  Id. at 203 (explaining how people rarely think their vote will determine an outcome and 
the consequences of their voting choices will rarely impact them directly).  The idea of effortful 
thinking to avoid irrational behavior is related to Daniel Kahneman’s work on the dual-process 
theory of cognition, which breaks down judgment into two systems: System 1 and System 2.  Daniel 
Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 697 (2003).  System 1 thinking deals with operations that are “automatic, effortless, 
associative, [and] implicit (not available to introspection).”  Id. at 698.  System 2 thinking, by con-
trast, deals with operations that are “slower, serial, effortful, [and] more likely to be consciously 
monitored and deliberately controlled.”  Id.  
 125.  In their 2015 article, Gary Lucas and Slavisa Tasic provide a comprehensive overview of 
BPCT and present “various biases and heuristics that impair the judgment of political actors.”  Lucas 
& Tasic, supra note 123, at 265.  Take for instance the “antiforeign bias.”  Id. at 203.  If voters were 
rational, they would not support tariffs and protectionist trade policies; however, because voters are 
suspicious of people who are different from themselves, they “underestimate the economic benefits 
of interaction with foreigners.”  Id. at 237 (quoting BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL 
VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 36 (2007)).  
 126.  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 7 (2011).   
 127.  Jeffrey Friedman, Popper, Weber, and Hayek: The Epistemology and Politics of Igno-
rance, 17 CRITICAL REV. i, xx (2005); see also Lucas & Tasic, supra note 123, at 218–23.   
 128.  Though opinions can be mixed on companies like Facebook and Google, platform compa-
nies generally enjoy positive reputations.  See Karsten Strauss, The World’s Most Reputable Com-
panies, 2016, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/karstenstrauss/2016/03/22/the-worlds-most-reputable-companies-
2016/#f19adaf23389 (naming Google, Apple, Microsoft, and eBay among the world’s most reputa-
ble companies). 
 129.  Aarti Shahani, In the Battle Between Lyft and Uber, the Focus Is on Drivers, NPR (Jan. 
18, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/01/18/463473462/is-uber-good-
to-drivers-it-s-relative; Olivia Solon, Is Lyft Really the “Woke” Alternative to Uber?, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/29/is-lyft-really-the-woke-al-
ternative-to-uber. 
 130.  Friedman, supra note 127, at xx. 
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b.  In-Group Bias 
In-group bias is a well-documented phenomenon in which people tend 
to favor others like them (the “in-group”) over others (the “out-group”).131  
There are several causes of in-group bias, from genetics (human survival has 
depended on groups) to the positive effects on self-esteem (boosting the 
group boosts oneself). In-group bias is evident throughout politics.132  For 
example, in response to the same proposed California ridesharing legislation 
discussed in Part II,133 Uber sent an email to users that read in part: 
It’s time to take a stand. Next week, the California Senate Appro-
priations Committee will vote on AB 2293, a bill that would re-
quire companies like Uber to provide 20x the insurance that taxis 
must carry in California.  This proposed legislation is part of a 
backroom deal by the insurance industry, taxi companies and trial 
attorneys, designed to funnel more premiums and fees to these al-
ready entrenched industries.134 
Uber clearly wanted users to separate its innovative ride sharing service from 
the extant incumbent industries and create an us-versus-them mentality. 
Platforms that rely on networks of users can also exploit the in-group 
bias by identifying friends who support the platforms’ positions.  Though not 
technically Platform Advocacy, because Facebook was not pushing its polit-
ical agenda, in a concealed experiment Facebook noticeably increased users’ 
voting behavior by simply showing a user’s friends who had voted in an elec-
tion.135  The experiment showed some Facebook users a link to find their 
polling place, a button they could click to say, “I Voted,” and a sampling of 
profile pictures of their friends who already voted.136  Others were shown a 
link to polling places and the button, but not the profile pictures of their 
friends.137  Users who saw friends that voted were 0.39% more likely to 
vote.138  Although a small percentage, with Facebook’s 1.47 billion active 
                                                          
 131.  Brian Mullen et al., Ingroup Bias as a Function of Salience, Relevance, and Status: An 
Integration, 22 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 103, 104 (1992); see also Lucas & Tasic, supra note 123, at 
234–37.   
 132.  DONALD R. KINDER & CINDY D. KAM, US AGAINST THEM: ETHNOCENTRIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN OPINION 48–52 (2009); Lucas & Tasic, supra note 123, at 234.   
 133.  See supra Section II.A.2.b. 
 134.  Jon Fleischman, CA Uber Users Get Email to Oppose Onerous California Bill, BREITBART 
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/california/2014/08/08/ca-uber-users-get-email-to-op-
pose-onerous-california-bill/ (quoting the Uber email). 
 135.  Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political 
Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295, 295–96 (2012), https://www.nature.com/articles/nature11421; see 
also Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 335 (2014) (arguing 
that “digital gerrymandering” could easily flip an election).  
 136.  Bond et al., supra note 135, at 295. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 295–96.  
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daily users, the increase shows how a simple manipulation of the interface 
could have a profound impact on in-group bias and voter behavior.139 
c.  Action Bias 
Action bias discourages careful deliberation and encourages fast ac-
tion.140  It stems from the visceral need to act after something bad happens or 
if one is simply bored.141  Action bias can occur when platforms stir up emo-
tions and make it easy for users to do something about it.  In Google’s 
SOPA/PIPA campaign, for example, Google made people think the govern-
ment was going to censor the web.142  This sparked outrage and encouraged 
millions of people to take the simple step to sign the online petition. 
Furthermore, action bias can influence how lawmakers behave.  If there 
is a public outcry of support for a particular policy, whether that support is 
real or manufactured, lawmakers may fail to take the time to properly delib-
erate and will, therefore, act rashly.  Take for instance subliminal messaging 
in advertising in the mid-twentieth century.  Despite clear evidence that sub-
liminal messaging did not work, public outcry forced the FCC to consider 
whether or not it harmed the public interest.143  
d.  Primacy Effect 
Lastly, platforms can influence public perceptions through the primacy 
effect, which biases people toward information they see first.  As Robert Ep-
stein and Ronald E. Robertson demonstrated, platforms that provide search 
functions, namely Google, can use the primacy effect to shift the preferences 
of undecided voters by twenty percent or more.144  Platforms can also use this 
primacy effect to push a particular position.  If they bury opposing infor-
mation, platforms can unfairly bias people in favor of their position.145 
                                                          
 139.  The authors of the study drive home this point by citing the fact that George Bush beat Al 
Gore in the 2000 U.S. presidential election by only 537 votes in Florida.  Id. at 295.  For Facebook 
statistics, see Our History, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Sept. 
25, 2018). 
 140.  See Lucas & Tasic, supra note 123, at 231–32.   
 141.  Anthony Patt & Richard Zeckhauser, Action Bias and Environmental Decisions, 21 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 45, 45 (2000).  
 142.  See supra Part I. 
 143.  Calo, supra note 71, at 997. 
 144.  Robert Epstein & Ronald E. Robertson, The Search Engine Manipulation Effect (SEME) 
and Its Possible Impact on the Outcomes of Elections, 112 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 
E4512, E4512 (2015), http://www.pnas.org/content/112/33/E4512.full.pdf?with-ds=yes; see also 
Robert Epstein, How Google Could Rig the 2016 Election, POLITICO (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/how-google-could-rig-the-2016-election-
121548. 
 145.  In their article, Epstein and Robertson warned of the potential harm of such an effect since 
search rankings are controlled almost entirely by a single company, like Google.  Epstein & Rob-
ertson, supra note 144, at E4513.  Lucas Introna and Helen Nissenbaum also warned of the potential 
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2.  The Means for Exploiting Consumer Vulnerabilities 
As mentioned previously, platforms digitally mediate interactions.146  
Thus, through their design choices they create many opportunities to take 
advantage of “flaws in human decision-making to get individuals to choose 
one alternative [over] another.”147 Often, platforms do this by encouraging 
users to buy goods or services.  Ryan Calo identified this form of influence 
as “digital market manipulation,” which is a combination of “personalization 
with the intense systemization made possible by mediated consumption.”148  
Personalization involves analyzing massive amounts of consumer data to tar-
get users at a personal level.149  Systemization refers to the use of technology 
to automatically customize digital interactions to prey on user vulnerabili-
ties.150  Calo’s conceptualization of personalization and systemization in the 
marketing context provide a useful backdrop for understanding how Platform 
Advocacy may track onto the sincerity and consent dimensions and trend to-
ward astroturfing.   
a.  Personalization 
The very same tactics used to get consumers to buy particular products 
can be used to shape their behavior as political actors. For example, Airbnb 
customizes emails and messages to make people feel more connected to the 
                                                          
harms of search engines on democracy.  Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: 
Why the Politics of Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169, 169 (2000). 
 146.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 147.  Kevin Vallier, On the Inevitability of Nudging, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 818 (2016) 
(citing Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn Welch, Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 
123, 128 (2010)).  As first explained by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, design choices can be 
used to “nudge” people to make particular decisions.  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2009).  A nudge is 
a subtler form of influence than shaping and involves “any aspect of the choice architecture that 
alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly chang-
ing their economic incentives.”  Id. 
 148.  Calo, supra note 71, at 1021.  
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
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platform and, therefore, more likely to support its particular position.151 Plat-
forms can also influence voter behavior through “blending.”152 Blending in-
volves taking a photograph of a user and putting it near a photograph of a 
politician.  When a person’s face and a politician’s face are close together, 
cognitive biases, including the intent bias, are triggered.153  These biases 
make an individual more likely to trust, and subsequently vote for, a politi-
cian.154 
“Persuasion profiling” is another example of personalization.  It not only 
targets relevant advertisements to particular individuals, it presents infor-
mation in a personalized way.155 Based on a record of user behavior, plat-
forms can determine which persuasion techniques (for example, appeals to 
authority, scarcity, and consensus) are most effective on that particular 
user.156 Personalization capabilities made possible by digitally mediated in-
teractions and access to user information can be very powerful.   
Platforms can also use their own internal data to predict and target indi-
viduals who are most likely to advocate on the platforms’ behalf.157 Mining 
data to find and subsequently ignite a sympathetic group of supporters is not 
in and of itself nefarious; however, it can skew how lawmakers perceive con-
stituents’ concerns.158 
                                                          
 151. See e.g., Email from Airbnb to Abbey Stemler, Assistant Professor of Business Law and 
Ethics, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University (Jan. 11, 2018) (on file with the author); see 
also Lessons Learned from Airbnb’s Email Specialist: An interview with Lucas Chevillard of 
Airbnb, REALLY GOOD EMAILS (Jan. 5, 2016), https://explore.reallygoodemails.com/lessons-
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https://www.abtasty.com/blog/customization-and-personalization-two-sides-of-the-same-millen-
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 152.  Lisa Marshall Manheim, The Nudging Ballot? A Response to Professor Foley, 89 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. ONLINE 65, 68–69 (2014) (discussing the technique of blending a photograph of a politician 
with a photograph of a user to make her more inclined to trust the politician). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Eli Pariser, Welcome to the Brave New World of Persuasion Profiling, WIRED (Apr. 26, 
2011, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/04/st_essay_persuasion_profiling/. 
 156.  Maurits Kaptein & Dean Eckles, Heterogeneity in the Effects of Online Persuasion, 26 J. 
INTERACTIVE MARKETING 176, 176 (2012).  In fact, direct marketing is essential to the business 
models of many platforms, such as Facebook and Google.  Id.   
 157.  See Davey Alba, Google and Facebook Still Reign Over Digital Advertising, WIRED (July 
29, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-facebook-online-ad-kings/.  
 158.  WALKER, supra note 14, at 12–13.  As Edward T. Walker argued, public affairs consulting 
firms are skilled at mining data and targeting individuals with carefully crafted messages who are 
likely to participate in grassroots activity.  Id. at 12–13, 155–91.  Walker defined a public affairs 
consultancy as a “professional service firm that contracts with an organizational client in order to 
manage the client’s political and social environment strategically through campaigns that mobilize 
public participation, often in coordination with traditional forms of lobbying.”  Id. at 23.  Partici-
pants are most commonly higher-income individuals with the time and resources to be active.  Id. 
at 23, 157.  Walker suggested that these “individuals [are] already over-represented in the political 
system,” thereby “exacerbat[ing] participatory inequalities.”  Id. at 11, 157; see also Henry E. Brady 
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b.  Systemization 
When the term was first coined in 1985, astroturf lobbying would have 
required incredible amounts of time and expense.159  A simulated letter writ-
ing campaign, for example, would have required cold-calling individuals or 
targeting them through newspaper advertisements and mailers.  Now, plat-
forms can automatically, methodically, and repeatedly reach out to individu-
als with little to no effort through digital communications—emails and 
texts—and interface design—pop-messages and click-through screens within 
the platform. And, as the Section below describes, these platforms are con-
stantly improving their understanding of human behavior in order to exploit 
vulnerabilities more efficiently. 
B.  A Perfect Storm for Influence 
The previous Section showcased how platforms can subtly manipulate 
user behavior by exploiting known cognitive vulnerabilities.  This Section 
outlines how this manipulation of behavior can create an ideal situation for 
platforms to impact the regulations that govern them. 
1.  The Network Effect 
Platforms do not have the power to manipulate just a few users, they 
have the power to manipulate large segments of the general population.  
Airbnb, for example, has nearly as many users as the population of France, 
Italy, and Australia combined.160 This is attributed to network effects.  
Simply stated, a network effect occurs when more people use a system more 
people will also want to use it.161  For example, the more people who list their 
homes on Airbnb, the more guests will be enticed to join the platform.  This 
effect can produce unrestrained monopolies (for example, Airbnb for home 
                                                          
et al., Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activ-
ists, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 153, 154 (1999). 
 159.  See supra notes 13, 55 (defining “astroturf lobbying” and explaining the origins of the term 
“astroturf”). 
 160.  Reuters, Airbnb CEO Invites Some Property Hosts to Executive Board Meetings, FORTUNE 
(Mar. 7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/07/airbnb-ceo-hosts/ (stating that Airbnb has an esti-
mated 150 million users); see Australia, CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/li-
brary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2018) (stating the popu-
lation of Australia is 23,232,413); France, CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html (last updated Aug. 30, 
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world-factbook/geos/it.html.  
 161.  Nicholas Economides, Antitrust Issues in Network Industries, in THE REFORM OF EC 
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sharing and Amazon for online shopping162) and creates a fierce urgency to 
understand how to properly regulate them. 
2.  Iteration 
Control over the design of the user interface not only allows platforms 
to systematically personalize user interactions to exploit biases, it can give 
platforms free reign to experiment on users to uncover even more vulnerabil-
ities.  This ability to keep iterating and improving the platforms to find the 
most effective methods of influence is unprecedented and may lead platforms 
to understand our behavior better than we understand ourselves.163 
The data network effect, similar to the network effect described above, 
supports this iterative process.  The data network effect occurs when a prod-
uct becomes better as users put more data into it, generally through machine 
learning.164  Google, for example, greatly benefits from the data network ef-
fect—the more users who search, the better Google can fine tune its algo-
rithms to produce meaningful results for users.165 
3.  Little to No Cost 
Since platforms can create activist-inspiring content at no real cost to 
themselves and then disseminate that content through company channels, it 
is difficult for users to realize that platforms are indirectly funding grassroots 
activity.  Take the example of Reddit, an online news aggregator and discus-
sion website.  On July 12, 2017, the Day of Action for Net Neutrality, it ma-
nipulated its landing page to show a very slowly typed message that read: 
The internet’s less fun when your favorite sites load slowly, isn’t 
it?  Whether you’re here for news, AMAs, or some good old-fash-
ioned cats in business attire, the internet’s at its best when you—
                                                          
 162.  Amazon captures fifty-one cents for every dollar spent online in the United States. TAPLIN, 
supra note 33, at 121.  
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not internet service providers—decide what you see online.  To-
day, u/kn0thing and I are calling on you to be the heroes we need.  
Please go to battleforthenet.com and tell the FCC that you support 
the open internet.—u/spez166 
This message affected users’ experiences, but the cost to Reddit was 
minimal.167 It also made it easier for Reddit’s users to contact lawmakers, 
thereby lowering the burdens of their engagement.  This Platform Advocacy 
was incredibly effective.  On the whole, the Day of Action encouraged users 
to submit over 1.5 million comments to the FCC’s website and around 3.5 
million emails to members of Congress.168 
So, what is the consequence of this low-cost, constantly improving, and 
widespread persuasive power?  In one word: influence.  We know lawmakers 
take notice when their constituents reach out to them.169  Unsurprisingly, we 
can see the cause and effect of Platform Advocacy on actual policy.170  Take 
for example ride-sharing, as reporter Karen Weise wrote: “Each government, 
whether municipal or state, goes through its own process to craft rules, but in 
the end, officials generally codify the insurance coverage, background-check 
policies, and inspection protocols Uber already has in place.  Uber makes the 
rules; cities fall in line.”171  Lawmakers are influenced in precisely the ways 
we would expect, and there is no natural limit to the pressure that can be 
exerted.  As a result, platforms are creating legal environments in their favor. 
Industries have always pushed their interests through lobbying and other 
forms of advocacy; however, the shape and impact of Platform Advocacy 
takes corporate strategy to a new level.  As a consequence of Platform Advo-
cacy and other factors, such as internet exceptionalism172 and federal laws 
that limit regulation of online companies,173 platforms are unrestrained and 
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able to grow their dominance in the marketplace.174  While Platform Advo-
cacy has yet to clearly influence political spheres in deep and dramatic ways, 
regulators and users should not suffer from a lack of imagination.  They must 
realize that Platform Advocacy not only exists, it can profoundly influence 
key assumptions within our democracy. 
IV.  PLATFORM ADVOCACY AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Moving on to the potential consequences of Platform Advocacy for de-
mocracy, this Part explains how Platform Advocacy can interfere with delib-
eration over values and policies among users and lawmakers. 
In 1980, Joseph M. Bessette first identified the concept of deliberative 
democracy in the context of U.S. constitutional theory, which was later clar-
ified by Cass R. Sunstein.175 To understand the term, it is perhaps easiest to 
go back to the framing of the Constitution as explained in Sunstein’s 1985 
article.176 
Prior to the drafting of the Constitution, ideas of deliberative democracy 
emerged as a solution to the Antifederalists’ concern that a large national 
government would reduce citizens’ ability to participate in democracy and 
thus undermine civic virtue177 and increase corruption.178  The Antifederalists 
preferred a form of direct democracy, where individuals would debate and 
deliberate in small settings.179 
By contrast, the Federalists, led by James Madison, generally be-
lieved180 that corrupt factions were a consequence of direct democracy181—
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(2017). See also Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 383 (2017). 
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where apathy was destined to occur and “common passion or interest will . . . 
be felt by a majority of the whole.”182  More specifically, the Federalists be-
lieved that “democracies were continually subject to tumult, disorder, and 
confusion; [and] that citizens often sacrificed their independent judgment to 
the pleasing promises of artful orators.”183  A large republic, dependent on 
representation, would solve these populist concerns because representatives 
could better embody “the cool and deliberate sense of the community.”184 
Furthermore, the Federalists believed that representatives were more 
knowledgeable about public affairs because they exercised their power in an 
institutional setting, which would encourage collective reasoning.185  As a 
result, representatives have a filtering effect that ensures decisions would be 
the result of study, debate, and reflection, not just popular sentiment.186  “In-
deed, the task of the legislator was very close to the task of the citizen in the 
traditional republican conception” in the sense that the legislator should, and 
more practically could, be committed to civic virtue.187 These structural ideas 
for supporting deliberative democracy are replicated at all levels of govern-
ment in the United States.188 
While one could argue that the Framers were perhaps motivated by priv-
ilege and paternalism, in light of the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the Eu-
ropean Union and the nationalist passions that captured the U.S. electorate in 
2016, the Framer’s concerns seem especially prescient.189  Arguably, direct 
democracy fueled by populist rhetoric, recently and throughout history, led 
people to make decisions that go against their own self-interest.190  Thus, 
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while decisions are motivated “by the people,” they were not actually “for 
the people.”191 
As discussed in greater detail below, later ideas surrounding deliberative 
democracy moved beyond a focus on American constitutional design and ex-
panded to the “decision procedure” that can help secure the best political out-
comes by attaining “the free and reasoned assent” of lawmakers and citi-
zens.192  In essence, this more global form of deliberative democracy is about 
the process that best brings about “the public use of reason.”193 
A.  The Fundamentals of Deliberative Democracy 
This Section does not attempt to fully explore the complex theory be-
hind deliberative democracy, though it is rich and illuminating.194  It does, 
however, pinpoint the true threats Platform Advocacy can have on delibera-
tive democracy.  To do this, this Section examines some of the characteristics 
of deliberative democracy, as outlined by Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. 
Thompson,195 and the role of the representative, as articulated by Sunstein. 
1.  Reason-Giving 
According to Gutmann and Thompson, deliberative democracy requires 
citizen autonomy.196  As equals, lawmakers and citizens should debate prin-
ciples and policies with respect.197  However, in the Platform Advocacy con-
text, users exercise little autonomy, and there is no exchange of reasoning 
because many users simply parrot arguments.  Thus, while users may be in-
spired to protest or contact friends and representatives, their reasoning is hol-
low.  Arguments absent of thought or sincerity do not treat listeners on all 
sides of an issue with respect.  They also do not lead to meaningful delibera-
tion.   
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2.  Accessibility 
The second fundamental characteristic of deliberative democracy is ac-
cessibility.  Deliberation should not only come from representatives, but “and 
by debating and deliberating citizens, and by their shaping a ‘public view’ of 
the common good and expressing a ‘public voice.’”198 To effect this, individ-
uals first must equally have “[t]he cognitive conditions of decision making” 
that allow a person to fully understand the argument.199  In other words, rea-
soning must be void of manipulation.200 As detailed throughout this Article, 
platforms have the capabilities to influence and perhaps manipulate user 
opinion and behavior through framing and design choices. These capabilities 
can compromise accessibility at the user level. 
Furthermore, without the ability to amplify opinions through a platform, 
certain groups will be denied access to public deliberation or treated as infe-
riors because they do not have the voices of millions backing them up.201  
Thus again, deliberative democracy will be compromised because the neces-
sary power to influence largely rests in the hands of the few successful plat-
forms.  For example, consider a traditional cab company’s distinct disad-
vantage vis-à-vis Uber when trying to get all the individuals in its city who 
enjoy, use, and like taxis to collectively come together to fight against pro-
ride-sharing legislation.   
3.  Filtering 
The final tenant of deliberative democracy described here is that elective 
representatives and policymakers must play a filtering role.  As Sunstein ex-
plained, representatives are: 
accountable to the public; their deliberative task [is] not disembod-
ied.  The framers thus created political checks designed to ensure 
that representatives would not stray too far from the desires of their 
constituents.  The result was a hybrid conception of representation, 
in which legislators were neither to respond blindly to constituent 
pressures nor to undertake their deliberations in a vacuum.202 
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Deliberation by representatives falls on a spectrum—from blind reliance 
on constituent desires to action without constituent input.  The ideal repre-
sentatives would fall somewhere in between: They must be able to “under-
stand and interpret ‘the deliberative sense of the community’” by researching 
issues, debating them, and avoiding the temptation to be swept up by popular 
and ill-informed passions.203 However, that is a tall order for any representa-
tive, especially in light of the current realities described below. 
The Founders, and even theorists in the late-twentieth century, could 
never have anticipated how digital technologies could manipulate and stim-
ulate public outrage and pressure.  Nor could they have anticipated the ability 
of citizens to directly express their views to lawmakers.  Gone are the days 
when a town hall meeting, letter, or parade were the only ways to interact 
with a representative.204  Today, a constituent can effortlessly tweet, text, 
email, or post to a representative’s Facebook wall.  While much of a repre-
sentative’s social media and email may be monitored by staffers, there is a 
great deal of evidence to suggest that lawmakers take notice of aggregated, 
public comments.205  Furthermore, because of the network effect described 
previously, platforms have enormous user bases.  So, even if only a small 
fraction of users participate in an advocacy campaign, policymakers must 
take notice or fear reelection trouble. These realities inhibit filtering and can 
negatively affect the creation of good and just policy. 
Democracy depends on leaders who are responsive to the preferences of 
their constituents.206  However, when those preferences are manufactured 
through elite manipulation, lawmakers must be skeptical.207  Furthermore, if 
we allow Platform Advocacy to continue or grow unrestrained, lawmakers 
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may be unable to sift through the tweets, texts, petitions, and emails to discern 
preferences at all.  As the next Part explains, there are ways lawmakers can 
become more skilled at detecting and managing Platform Advocacy. 
V.  CASE STUDY: FACEBOOK IN INDIA 
If you think of a modern monopoly, Facebook is surely one of the first 
companies that comes to mind.  It is responsible for approximately twenty-
five percent of all traffic on the internet and the primary news source for 
forty-four percent of Americans.208  Facebook has incredible power in ex-
pected and unexpected ways.  A case in point of the unexpected occurred in 
January of 2012.  At that time, researchers ran an experiment to see how Fa-
cebook could influence people’s emotions.  They changed approximately 
700,000 users’ newsfeeds (that is, the stream of updates and posts that you 
see when you log on to the site).209  Some people viewed more positive posts 
and others saw more negative ones.  This actually affected users’ emotions—
those users who were manipulated posted more positive or negative posts 
themselves depending on their experimental group.210 
Now, imagine what would happen if Facebook intentionally manipu-
lated their consumer interface to not only nudge people to change their emo-
tions but to expressly encourage people to vote for a specific candidate or 
push for a particular policy. This type of Platform Advocacy occurred in In-
dia as first described in Part II.211  
Starting in 2014, Facebook worked on a project, called Internet.org, to 
bring the internet to millions of unconnected users in India.212  Under the 
rhetoric of making “connectivity . . . a human right,” Facebook encouraged 
Indian telecommunications companies to offer free data access to a suite of 
sites curated by Facebook, including the social networking site itself.213  This, 
of course, had the added benefit of capturing the untapped Indian market, 
which would enable Facebook to continue its exponential growth. 
However, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”) decided 
to consider whether India was going to promote net neutrality or allow tele-
communication companies to provide free access to certain sites and not oth-
ers.214 The TRAI asked for public comment on the issue, which eventually 
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sent Facebook into full campaign mode to stop the threat to Internet.org, later 
repackaged as Free Basics.215  As described by the Guardian, the platform 
manipulated its interface to encourage its users to influence the TRAI’s de-
cision: 
Every user in India who logged into Facebook was greeted 
with a special message from Facebook, which said: “Free 
Basics is a first step to connecting 1 billion Indians to the 
opportunities online. But without your support, it could be 
banned in a matter of weeks.” Below the message, a large 
purple button invited users to click and “send email” to the 
regulator.216 
According to Facebook, sixteen million Indians sent emails to the TRAI 
encouraging it to allow Facebook to facilitate the free mobile internet ser-
vice—an incredible response to say the least.217  The TRAI eventually had to 
develop computer programs to sift through the avalanche of emails.218  When 
they did, they discovered most of the comments in favor of Free Basics 
(likely populated by Facebook users) did not answer the questions proposed 
by the TRAI for comment. The TRAI “worried that Free Basics’ supporters 
were not ‘making informed decisions’ and chastised Facebook for reducing 
the consultation to a popularity contest.”219 
After much debate, the TRAI decided to support net neutrality, which 
effectively shut down Facebook’s hopes of capturing market share with Free 
Basics.220  In the TRAI’s explanatory memorandum, it detailed why net neu-
trality should be supported and presented a compelling case against Face-
book’s simplistic message of “digital equality.”221  Among the various argu-
ments made by the TRAI to support net neutrality, none were presented to 
Facebook users by Facebook.  For example, the TRAI stated one service pro-
vider charging differential prices for content could damage the “architecture 
of the internet,” which relies on openness and the ability to link content.222  
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Furthermore, the TRAI was concerned about allowing providers to “define 
the nature of access,” which would shape users’ experiences and effectively 
censor the information they see.223  Despite its lack of success with Platform 
Advocacy in this context, Facebook demonstrated its ability and willingness 
to use its platform to mobilize its user base to advocate on its behalf. 
The TRAI case also led to several helpful insights about ways to uphold 
the key pillars of a healthy deliberative democracy: reason-giving, accessi-
bility, and filtering. First, as it relates to filtering, the TRAI viewed the mas-
sive public interest in its request for public comment as suspect.  Thus, the 
TRAI took steps to identify authentic messages, which involved creating 
computer programs to identify and discount form messages and to reject mes-
sages that did not respond to the questions presented.  This filtering helped 
lawmakers sort out, to a degree, insincere messages and those given without 
consent.  With the remaining messages the TRAI was better able to view and 
understand constituents’ reasoning. 
Likewise, with respect to reason-giving, the TRAI was able to manage 
the public response to its decision through a clear articulation of its reasoning 
in the multi-page explanatory memorandum.  Influenced but not determined 
by popular sentiment, the memorandum was an exemplar in reason-giving 
and filtering.  It helped explain to the public the TRAI’s take on the pros and 
cons of its decision.  Such reason-giving helped improve transparency and 
affirm the exchange of ideas and debate among constituents and representa-
tives. 
Lastly, regarding accountability, the TRAI directly called out Facebook 
for its Platform Advocacy and urged the platform to carefully avoid manipu-
lating users.224  When government bodies recognize forms of manipulation, 
which reduce access to information, they should not stand idly by.  By con-
trast, they must speak up, so that platforms realize there is zero tolerance for 
astroturfing forms of Platform Advocacy.  This vigilance ensures that the 
power of Platform Advocacy will not drown competing voices, thus making 
the public forum accessible to all. 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In his piece on astroturfing, journalist Ryan Sager argued, “Organizing 
isn’t cheating.  Doing everything in your power to get your people to show 
up is basic politics.”225  However, as explored in this Article, there is a fine 
line between convincing people to join your cause and using them as puppets.  
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This Section outlines three recommendations to improve democratic deliber-
ation in the context of Platform Advocacy and briefly addresses correspond-
ing First Amendment implications.226 
A.  Disclaimer Notices 
If a platform decides to use its interface to push a particular political 
point, it should be required to provide notice to users that the positions are 
the opinions of the platform.  Such disclaimers would promote access to in-
formation and could resemble disclaimers in endorsements, which require 
celebrities to disclaim they are being paid to endorse a product (for example, 
“#ad”),227 and election-related advertising, which requires sponsors to indi-
cate who is “responsible for the content of this advertising.”228  For example, 
if Google wants to oppose online piracy laws through its platform, it would 
need to inform users that it has a vested business interest in seeing the legis-
lation fail in some way before users sign a petition or are patched-through to 
their congressperson. 
In the highly controversial opinion in Citizens United v. FEC,229 the Su-
preme Court held that the political speech of corporations is entitled to the 
same constitutional protections as natural persons.230  Therefore, the strict 
scrutiny standard applies to laws that may impair the political speech of cor-
porations.231  This means the government must prove that the restriction, such 
as a disclaimer, furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest.232 
While the Court in Citizens United found that an outright prohibition on 
speech close to an election was unconstitutional, the Court upheld disclaimer 
and disclosure requirements related to the source of funds for election-based 
advertisements.233  The Court reasoned that the government has a compelling 
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interest in making sure the electorate can “make informed decisions and give 
proper weight to different speakers and messages.”234 
Similarly, the Court has historically upheld disclaimer and disclosure 
laws related to astroturfing.  Most notably, in United States v. Harriss,235 the 
Court upheld the disclosure requirements in the FRLA.236  As discussed pre-
viously, the FRLA required companies to disclose expenditures related to in-
fluencing federal legislation through “direct communication” or with “direct 
pressure[]” on members of Congress.237  Under the “direct pressure,” activi-
ties requiring disclosure included an “artificially simulated letter campaign,” 
which is a classic example of astroturfing.238  The Court upheld those disclo-
sure requirements based on principles of deliberative democracy.  The Court 
stated: 
[T]he American ideal of government by elected representatives de-
pends to no small extent on [the ability of Congress] to properly 
evaluate [the myriad of pressures to which they are regularly sub-
jected].  Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be 
drowned out by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored 
treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal.  
This is the evil which the Lobbying Act was designed to help pre-
vent.239 
As supported by Citizens United and Harriss, disclaimer laws would 
further the compelling government interest of ensuring the marketplace of 
ideas, thereby allowing citizens and their representatives to deliberate with 
necessary facts in hand.240 
B.  Outlawing Forced Action and Incentives 
Though platforms have yet to require users to reach out to lawmakers 
before they can continue to participate on a platform, it would only take a 
small modification to a user’s interface (similar to accepting terms of service) 
to force such consumer action.  To prevent the potential harms inherent in 
forced action, Congress should pass a federal law to prevent platforms from 
requiring users to contact any lawmaker or sign any petition before using a 
platform’s service.  In addition, the law should prohibit platforms from 
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providing incentives to users for their advocacy, such as a monetary benefit, 
access to unique platform features, or eligibility for prizes.241 
The First Amendment analysis prohibiting such forced action and in-
centives would be similar to a disclaimer requirement.  The government has 
a compelling interest in helping lawmakers make informed decisions and ac-
curately judge the opinions of their constituents.  And, Congress could nar-
rowly tailor its legislation to achieve that interest by identifying specific, un-
acceptable behavior. 
C.  Embrace Technology to Filter 
 Both disclaimer notices and outlawing forced action are citizen-facing 
recommendations.  From the India case study,242 however, we can identify 
several government-facing suggestions.  These include: (1) share reasoning 
for policy decisions; (2) punish or shame platforms using Platform Advocacy 
inappropriately; and (3) use technology to enable filtering.  All of these rec-
ommendations will help enhance deliberative democracy; however, develop-
ing technology to effectively filter insincere or compelled constituent speech 
will serve the dual purpose of filtering and identifying inappropriate Platform 
Advocacy when it occurs.   
  India’s experience showed that simply discounting form messages and 
multiple messages from the same account is an effective first-line-of-defense 
filtering technique.  However, we can learn from tools and analytics devel-
oped by platforms themselves to shake out the bots, fake accounts, and for-
eign governments that discredit their own platforms to better ensure Platform 
Advocacy is on the appropriate side of the sincerity and consent dimen-
sions.243  For example, public comment websites could use CAPTCHA sys-
tems to ensure human activity and verify that constituents are who they say 
they are.244  They could also prohibit copy-and-pasting to ensure people write 
their own comments to some degree.  Furthermore, governing bodies could 
improve their constituent-management systems to verify identities and cross-
reference comments and messages in various forms to create a more accurate 
picture of constituent opinions. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Madison wrote in The Federalist, No. 10 that democracy requires public 
views to be passed through “the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose 
wisdom may best discern the true interests of their country, and whose patri-
otism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or 
partial considerations.”245  However, when a platform engages in astroturfing 
by reducing users’ consent for or sincerity of their advocacy, they corrupt 
Madison’s vision. Such forms of Platform Advocacy impede the exchange of 
ideas and provide platforms with the power to craft laws in their favor.  
Therefore, understanding why and when Platform Advocacy deserves legal 
intervention is necessary.  With dynamic and increasingly powerful technol-
ogies, we must ensure we have institutions, procedures, and means “to check 
or moderate unreflective popular sentiments and to promote the rule of de-
liberative majorities”246 now more than ever before.   
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